Yesterday, there was a thread on hacker news highlighting that many sites around the world were making available potentially sensitive information about their site via Apache’s server-status link (provided by mod-status).

The stated advice is to limit access to this and similar pages (such as the server info page provided by mod-info) by using Allow/Deny to limit access to requests from the local machine, thus:

<Location /server-status>
SetHandler server-status
Order deny,allow
Deny from all
Allow from 127.0.0.1 ::1

</Location>

Many distributions have this as the default configuration, but beware!

If you run Squid in a reverse proxy configuration, which many sites including this one do to improve performance under high load, you can easily expose such pages.

A common reverse proxy configuration is to run Squid on the local machine “in front” of Apache by configuring Squid to listen to port 80 and relaying to a local Apache server (which is bound to a different port). Under this configuration all requests to Apache will appear to be local, originating from the local machine.

Without extra steps being taken (such as using Squid ACLs) you could quite easily expose sensitive information you thought was only available to your local admins.

Beware!

It is the second time in as many days that I’m having to log into things and change passwords because of some less-than smart design decisions various web companies made when implementing their password database (looking at you Linkedin and Last.FM).

While these companies have clearly made a dangerous snafu, lets not be overly harsh on them. There but for the grace of god go all software developers. The real problem is passwords, and until we find something better, this kind of thing will keep happening.

Lets look at it from a UX viewpoint as well a security one for a moment, because they’re both linked. People, myself included, are phenomenally bad at creating secure passwords and remembering them. Predictably enough, this results in the vast majority of users using one memorable (but as a result easily guessable) password for everything, and/or writing all their passwords down somewhere… both things that are a bad idea from a security point of view and often elicit derisive snorts from security professionals clearly blessed with an eidetic memory.

Moving past Username and Password

Computers should adapt to humans, not the other way round. Isn’t it time we stopped wasting time trying to patch a clearly broken system and build something else?

This is of course much easier said than done, and the two current alternatives to username/password authentication available – OpenID and OAuth – are not without their issues.

OpenID is nice and decentralised, but the UX is just awful. Sign in with a URL? Try explaining that one over the phone to your mum.

OAuth has the benefit of being super super easy for the user (one or two mouse clicks to log in), so long as you’ve got an account with a given site’s blessed identity broker (for all practical purposes either Google, Facebook or Twitter). This model nudges towards a centralised identity model which I find very uncomfortable.

This centralisation raises new issues of catastrophic single points of failure. Not only do you have the issue of the service being a prime target for crackers, you also have a far more insidious and arguably more likely problem, basically, what happens when the identity broker you use for your 1000s of accounts goes out of business?

Not to mention, all three of the main identity brokers still fundamentally identify you with a username and password. Google and Facebook have added second layer authentication to their accounts, but Twitter is yet to implement anything (so if you have a twitter account and use it for authentication anywhere make sure your password is really really good).

So, what can we do to make this better?

Myself, I’d like to move to some sort of two factor authentication (combining something you have with something you know), at least for really important accounts. More and more people have mobile phones so perhaps something similar to the Google authenticator model or SMS code authentication for new machine sign-in would be a start.

Whatever we use, it needs to be decentralised, secure, and fundamentally easy for people to use. Because if whatever fancy solution we come up with provides a barrier between the user and what they want to do, it will be useless. People will just work out ways of circumventing the security in order to get things done, or simply not use the service at all.

Today, the most secure password-protected system you can ever build can be defeated by one forgetful user and a post-it note.

Our economy is officially in the grip of the much feared double dip recession, and since we’re all in it together it is our duty to save the country money wherever we can. We’re in the big society after all!

So, since the government’s plan to spy on every UK citizen’s email, IM and phone calls is going cost billions of pounds that could be better spent murdering brown people or giving the Queen a nice new boat for her jubilee, National “CC your emails to Theresa May” day hopes to save the government the cost by encouraging patriotic citizens such as yourself to simply forward all your emails to our beloved big sister!

Anyone know her cell number so I can conference her in to my meetings tomorrow as well?